ABSTRACT | 第3-4页 |
摘要 | 第5-11页 |
1 Introduction | 第11-23页 |
1.1 Research Background and Research Questions | 第11-13页 |
1.2 Research Motivations and Findings | 第13-20页 |
1.3 Research Contributions and Limitations | 第20-23页 |
2 Main Concepts and Literature Review | 第23-43页 |
2.1 What is Interlocking Directorate and Interlocking Directorate Network | 第23页 |
2.2 Why Interlocking Directorate Exists | 第23-27页 |
2.2.1 Interlocking Directorate Exists: Inter-organizational Perspective | 第24-26页 |
2.2.2 Interlocking Directorate Exists: Individual Perspective | 第26-27页 |
2.3 Interlocking Directorates and Firm Performance | 第27-35页 |
2.3.1 Resource Dependence Theory | 第27-28页 |
2.3.2 Corporation Governance Perspective | 第28-29页 |
2.3.3 Institutional Void Perspective | 第29-31页 |
2.3.4 Interlocking Directorates and Firm Performance: Evidences | 第31-35页 |
2.4 Interlocking Directorates and CEO compensation | 第35-38页 |
2.5 Interlocking Directorates and Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) | 第38-41页 |
2.6 Summary and Discussion | 第41-43页 |
3 Chinese Institutional Background and Hypothesis Development | 第43-79页 |
3.1 Chinese Institutional Background | 第43-52页 |
3.1.1 Institutional Voids in China’s Economic Reform | 第43-48页 |
3.1.2 Guanxi and Class Cohesion in Chinese Society | 第48-52页 |
3.2 The Model | 第52-58页 |
3.2.1 Model Assumptions | 第53-54页 |
3.2.2 Model Equilibrium | 第54-58页 |
3.3 Network of Interlocking Directorates and Firm Performance: an Explanation fromInstitutional Void Perspective | 第58-67页 |
3.3.1 Improved Firm Performance by Network-based Strategy | 第58-60页 |
3.3.2 Improved Firm Performance by Guanxi-based Transaction | 第60-63页 |
3.3.3 Variations in the Centrality-Performance Relationship | 第63-67页 |
3.4 Network of Interlocking Directorates and CEO Compensation | 第67-73页 |
3.4.1 CEO Compensation and Pay-Performance Sensitivity | 第67-69页 |
3.4.2 Variations in CEO Compensation and Pay-Performance Sensitivity | 第69-73页 |
3.5 Interlocking Directorates and Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) | 第73-77页 |
3.5.1 Firms Sharing Interlocking Directorates as Peers in Usage of RPE | 第73-76页 |
3.5.2 Variations in Usage of RPE based on Interlocking Firm Peers | 第76-77页 |
3.6 Summary | 第77-79页 |
4 Methodology, Sample and Data | 第79-88页 |
4.1 Main Measures | 第79-84页 |
4.1.1 Centralities of Interlocking Directorate Network | 第79-83页 |
4.1.2 Firm Performance | 第83-84页 |
4.1.3 CEO Compensation | 第84页 |
4.1.4 Aggregate Performance Measure of Peer Firms | 第84页 |
4.2 Sample Selection | 第84-85页 |
4.3 Data Description | 第85-88页 |
5 Results and Discussions | 第88-136页 |
5.1 Interlocking Directorate Network and Firm Performance | 第88-108页 |
5.1.1 Stock Return Prediction | 第88-92页 |
5.1.2 Changes in Accounting Profitability | 第92-94页 |
5.1.3 Robustness Tests | 第94-104页 |
5.1.4 Cross-sectional Variations in Centrality-Performance Relationship | 第104-108页 |
5.2 Interlocking Directorate Network and CEO Compensation | 第108-123页 |
5.2.1 Portfolio Difference in levels and changes of CEO Compensation | 第108-110页 |
5.2.2 Centrality, CEO Compensation and Pay-Performance Sensitivity | 第110-114页 |
5.2.3 Robustness Analyses | 第114-118页 |
5.2.4 Cross-sectional Variation in Centrality-Compensation Relationship | 第118-123页 |
5.3 Interlocking Directorates and Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) | 第123-135页 |
5.3.1 Interlocking Firm Peers and RPE in Sock Return | 第123-126页 |
5.3.2 Robustness Analysis of RPE | 第126-132页 |
5.3.3 Cross-sectional Variation in Usage of RPE | 第132-135页 |
5.4 Summary of Empirical Findings | 第135-136页 |
6 Conclusions | 第136-141页 |
6.1 Summary of Main Work and Findings | 第136-138页 |
6.2 Contributions and Limitations | 第138-141页 |
References | 第141-151页 |
Appendices | 第151-178页 |
Appendix Ⅰ Centrality Measures for Interlocking Directorate Network | 第151-155页 |
Appendix Ⅱ The Definitions of Variables | 第155-157页 |
Appendix Ⅲ Sample Statistics | 第157-159页 |
Appendix Ⅳ Chinese Version | 第159-178页 |
Acknowledgements | 第178-179页 |
Achievements | 第179-181页 |