| 摘要 | 第1-8页 |
| ABSTRACT | 第8-11页 |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | 第11-16页 |
| CONTENTS | 第16-20页 |
| CHAPTER 1 Introduction | 第20-29页 |
| ·Introduction to service outsourcing | 第20-23页 |
| ·Introduction to upstream collusion | 第23-24页 |
| ·Introduction to managerial delegation | 第24-25页 |
| ·Introduction to competition structure | 第25-26页 |
| ·Introduction to information sharing | 第26-28页 |
| ·Thesis organization | 第28-29页 |
| CHAPTER 2 Literature Review | 第29-36页 |
| ·Service outsourcing | 第29-30页 |
| ·Upstream collusion | 第30页 |
| ·Managerial delegation | 第30-31页 |
| ·Endogenous competition modes | 第31-33页 |
| ·Information sharing | 第33-36页 |
| CHAPTER 3 Service outsourcing under various channel power structures | 第36-64页 |
| ·Problem description | 第36页 |
| ·Model formulation and analysis | 第36-42页 |
| ·Benchmarking scenario:the integrated channel | 第38-39页 |
| ·Service outsourcing in the manufacturer-Stackelberg market | 第39-40页 |
| ·Service outsourcing in the vertical-Nash market | 第40-41页 |
| ·Service outsourcing in the retailer-Stackelberg market | 第41-42页 |
| ·Managerial implications with non-strategic service | 第42-54页 |
| ·Service analysis | 第43-44页 |
| ·Pricing implications | 第44-49页 |
| ·Channel strategies | 第49-52页 |
| ·Manufacturer-Stackelberg market | 第49-50页 |
| ·Vertical-Nash market | 第50-51页 |
| ·Retailer-Stackelberg market | 第51-52页 |
| ·The manufacturer's profitability under various channel structures | 第52-53页 |
| ·Analysis of channel performance | 第53-54页 |
| ·When service is a strategic decision | 第54-57页 |
| ·Baseline scenario:the integrated channel | 第54-55页 |
| ·Scenario Ⅰ:the manufacturer-Stackelberg market | 第55-56页 |
| ·Scenario Ⅱ:the vertical-Nash market | 第56页 |
| ·Scenario Ⅲ:the retailer-Stackelberg market | 第56-57页 |
| ·Managerial implications with strategic service | 第57-62页 |
| ·Service insights | 第57-58页 |
| ·Pricing insights | 第58-60页 |
| ·Channel strategies and profitability | 第60-62页 |
| ·Conclusions and future research | 第62-64页 |
| CHAPTER 4 Service outsourcing with quality decisions | 第64-89页 |
| ·Problem description | 第64-65页 |
| ·Notations and model formulation | 第65-67页 |
| ·When quality and service are non-strategic decisions | 第67-71页 |
| ·Manufacturer-Stackelberg market | 第67-68页 |
| ·Vertical-Nash market | 第68-69页 |
| ·Retailer-Stackelberg market | 第69-71页 |
| ·Implications of service outsourcing for non-strategic service or quality | 第71-77页 |
| ·Analyses of quality, service and price | 第72-75页 |
| ·Analyses of profitability and channel strategies | 第75-77页 |
| ·When quality and service are strategic decisions | 第77-81页 |
| ·Manufacturer-Stackelberg market | 第78-79页 |
| ·Vertical-Nash market | 第79页 |
| ·Retailer-Stackelberg market | 第79-81页 |
| ·Implications of service outsourcing for strategic non-price decisions | 第81-87页 |
| ·Analyses of price, quality and service | 第81-85页 |
| ·Analyses of profitability and channel strategies | 第85-87页 |
| ·Concluding remarks | 第87-89页 |
| CHAPTER 5 Manufacturers' channel competition with dealer's promotional service | 第89-106页 |
| ·Problem description | 第89页 |
| ·Model formulation and analysis | 第89-97页 |
| ·Channel mix II | 第90-91页 |
| ·Channel mix DI | 第91-94页 |
| ·Channel mix DD | 第94-97页 |
| ·Channel strategies by numerical analyses | 第97-104页 |
| ·Manufacturer i's channel strategies | 第97-101页 |
| ·Equilibrium channel strategies | 第101-104页 |
| ·Implications and future research | 第104-106页 |
| CHAPTER 6 Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives | 第106-117页 |
| ·Problem description | 第106页 |
| ·Model with downstream price competition | 第106-113页 |
| ·Incentive scheme P | 第109-111页 |
| ·Incentive scheme R | 第111-113页 |
| ·Model with downstream quantity competition | 第113-115页 |
| ·Incentive scheme P | 第113-114页 |
| ·Incentive scheme R | 第114-115页 |
| ·Concluding remarks | 第115-117页 |
| CHAPTER 7 Bertrand vs. Cournot competition with upstream collusion | 第117-128页 |
| ·Problem description | 第117页 |
| ·Upstream collusion under various competition structures | 第117-124页 |
| ·The Bertrand competition mode | 第118-120页 |
| ·The Cournot competition mode | 第120-121页 |
| ·The mixed Bertrand-Cournot competition mode | 第121-124页 |
| ·The strategic choices of downstream competition modes | 第124-126页 |
| ·The effects of upstream collusion on consumer surplus and social welfare | 第126-127页 |
| ·Concluding remarks | 第127-128页 |
| CHAPTER 8 The strategic peril of information sharing in a vertical-Nash channel | 第128-139页 |
| ·Problem introduction | 第128页 |
| ·Model analysis | 第128-138页 |
| ·When the information is not shared | 第130-132页 |
| ·When the information is shared | 第132-138页 |
| ·Conclusions | 第138-139页 |
| CHAPTER 9 Conclusions and future research | 第139-142页 |
| ·Conclusions | 第139-141页 |
| ·Future research | 第141-142页 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 第142-151页 |
| APPENDICES | 第151-160页 |
| 论文内容概要 | 第160-178页 |
