| 摘要 | 第4-7页 |
| ABSTRACT | 第7-9页 |
| LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS | 第10-14页 |
| CHAPTER 1 Introduction | 第14-30页 |
| 1.1 Significance of Study | 第14-17页 |
| 1.1.1 Research Background | 第14-15页 |
| 1.1.2 Statement of Research Problem | 第15-17页 |
| 1.1.3 Research Questions | 第17页 |
| 1.2 Main Argument | 第17-19页 |
| 1.3 Scope and Limitations | 第19-20页 |
| 1.4 Methodology | 第20-22页 |
| 1.4.1 Qualitative approach | 第20页 |
| 1.4.2 Comparative Case Study Design: Role of Political Actors | 第20-21页 |
| 1.4.3 Sources of Data: | 第21-22页 |
| 1.5 Literature Review | 第22-23页 |
| 1.6 Theoretical Framework/Application - Actor-Specific Theory | 第23-24页 |
| 1.7 What is Boko Haram? | 第24-30页 |
| CHAPTER 2 Assessing the Role of the UN, AU and US during the Leadership ofGoodluck Jonathan | 第30-37页 |
| 2.1 Brief History and Summary of Events during his Leadership | 第30-31页 |
| 2.2 UN Response | 第31页 |
| 2.3 US Refusal/Inability to Intervene | 第31-33页 |
| 2.4 AU Approves the Sending of Troops | 第33-35页 |
| 2.5 Defining the MNJTF, Its Operations and Achievements | 第35-37页 |
| CHAPTER 3 Assessing the Role of the UN, AU and US during the Leadership ofMuhammadu Buhari | 第37-41页 |
| 3.1 Brief History and Summary Events during his Leadership | 第37页 |
| 3.2 UN Response | 第37-38页 |
| 3.3 US Offers Support and Close Partnership | 第38-39页 |
| 3.4 AU Renews the Mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) | 第39-41页 |
| CHAPTER 4 Comparative Analysis | 第41-50页 |
| 4.1 Ineffective Leadership and Human Rights violations by Nigerian Military under FormerPresident Goodluck Jonathan | 第41-43页 |
| 4.2 Corruption allegations levelled against Goodluck Jonathan’s regime | 第43-47页 |
| 4.3 Issues of Sovereignty and Interference prevents collaborative efforts underGoodluck Jonathan | 第47页 |
| 4.4 Deteriorating relations with the US under Jonathan which is restored by Buhari | 第47-50页 |
| CHAPTER 5 Conclusions, Findings and Policy Recommendations | 第50-64页 |
| 5.1 Conclusions | 第50-52页 |
| 5.1.1 High Number of Muslims and it influence on the Boko Haram insurgency | 第50-51页 |
| 5.1.2 Gradual Change of Policy | 第51页 |
| 5.1.3 How the individual leaders matter | 第51-52页 |
| 5.2 Findings | 第52-62页 |
| 5.2.1 Boko Haram beliefs versus the rest of the World | 第52-55页 |
| 5.2.2 The ISIS Factor | 第55-56页 |
| 5.2.3 Uneven Economic development | 第56-58页 |
| 5.2.4 Overview on the activities of the MNJTF | 第58-59页 |
| 5.2.5 Boko Haram and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) | 第59-62页 |
| 5.3 Policy Recommendations | 第62-64页 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 第64-66页 |
