| 中文摘要 | 第5-9页 |
| Abstract | 第9-12页 |
| Notes on data collection | 第13-16页 |
| Abbreviations | 第16-17页 |
| Chapter 1 Introduction | 第17-30页 |
| 1.1 The RP-US historical alliance, the Philippines internal turmoil and the turningpoint | 第17-21页 |
| 1.2 Hypothesis and research questions | 第21-22页 |
| 1.3 Theoretical approach | 第22-24页 |
| 1.4 Methodology | 第24-25页 |
| 1.5 Literature Review | 第25-28页 |
| 1.6 Significance of Research | 第28页 |
| 1.7 Structure of the dissertation | 第28-30页 |
| Chapter 2 The Philippines’ internal threats and its increase in the turn of thecentury | 第30-47页 |
| 2.1 The internal security problems of the Philippines | 第30-40页 |
| 2.1.1 The concept of non-state actors (NSAs) | 第30-31页 |
| 2.1.2 The concept of terrorism and insurgency | 第31-33页 |
| 2.1.3 The Philippines’ historically dangerous NSAs | 第33-40页 |
| 2.2 The increase of the internal security problem: Estrada’s legacies to Arroyo’sgovernment | 第40-43页 |
| 2.3 Why the Philippines could not handle internal security alone | 第43-47页 |
| Chapter 3 The War on Terror and the engagement of the Philippines | 第47-54页 |
| 3.1 The War on Terror | 第47-49页 |
| 3.2 The engagement of the Philippines | 第49-54页 |
| Chapter 4 Shift of focus on RP-US relations | 第54-69页 |
| 4.1 RP-US security relations before 9/11 | 第54-56页 |
| 4.2 The threat of the NSA and its repercussion | 第56-59页 |
| 4.3 RP-US relations after 9/11 | 第59-67页 |
| 4.3.1 The mutual agreements: Shift of focus and Philippine foreign policy | 第59-64页 |
| 4.3.2 The US“real”assistance: achievements | 第64-67页 |
| 4.4 Analysis | 第67-69页 |
| Conclusions | 第69-75页 |
| Bibliography | 第75-81页 |
| Appendix I Detailed map of the Philippine administrative division | 第81-82页 |
| Appendix II Incidents caused by the NSAs | 第82-84页 |
| Appendix III Questions of the interviews | 第84页 |
