| 致谢 | 第4-5页 |
| Abstract | 第5页 |
| 摘要 | 第6-7页 |
| Table of Contents | 第7-11页 |
| Introduction | 第11-17页 |
| 1. Territory and Rivalry in Asian International Politics | 第17-79页 |
| 1.1 Current Research on Territorial Disputes | 第26-55页 |
| 1.1.1 Value of Territory Explanations | 第27-33页 |
| 1.1.2 Domestic Political Explanations | 第33-44页 |
| 1.1.3 Structural Explanations | 第44-54页 |
| 1.1.4 Conclusion | 第54-55页 |
| 1.2 Territorial Disputes in the Context of Rivalry | 第55-76页 |
| 1.2.1 Rivalry and Conflict Behavior | 第58-67页 |
| 1.2.2 Rivalry and Use of Force in Territorial Disputes | 第67-73页 |
| 1.2.3 Rivalry and Peaceful Territorial Dispute Settlement | 第73-76页 |
| 1.3 Methodology | 第76-79页 |
| 2. The India-China Rivalry and Territorial Dispute | 第79-143页 |
| 2.1 Introduction | 第79-81页 |
| 2.2 Origins of the India-China Strategic Rivalry and Territorial Dispute | 第81-92页 |
| 2.2.1 British India's Unresolved Borders | 第81-83页 |
| 2.2.2 Competition for Asian Leadership | 第83-84页 |
| 2.2.3 Conflicting Interests in Tibet | 第84-92页 |
| 2.3 Escalation,1958-1962:Rivalry,Domestic Pressures,and Windows of Opportunity | 第92-136页 |
| 2.3.1 Indian Perceptions of Chinese Weakness and the Forward Policy | 第93-116页 |
| 2.3.2 Indian Advances and China's Counterattack,1962:Rivalry and the Causes of India's Miscalculations | 第116-130页 |
| 2.3.5 Territorial Escalation and Settlement:The Domestic and International Politics of Strategic Rivalry | 第130-131页 |
| 2.3.6 Assessing Alternative Explanations for the 1962 War:Domestic Politics and Negative Power Shift | 第131-134页 |
| 2.3.7 Assessing Altrnative Explanation for China's Compromises:Frontier Unrest? | 第134-136页 |
| 2.4 China-India Rapprochement and Limited Escalation at Thag La,1980-1987 | 第136-141页 |
| 2.5 Conclusion | 第141-143页 |
| 3. The Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation in Northern Borneo | 第143-171页 |
| 3.1 Introduction | 第143-144页 |
| 3.2 Origins of the Indonesia-Malaysia Rivalry and Konfrontasi | 第144-151页 |
| 3.3 Escalation,1961-64:Rivalry and the Temptations of an Opponent's Internal Unrest | 第151-166页 |
| 3.3.1 Revolt in Brunei and Indonesia's Commencement of Guerrilla War | 第152-160页 |
| 3.3.2 Singapore Riots and Second Indonesian Escalation,July-September 1964 | 第160-165页 |
| 3.3.3 Assessing an Alternative Explanation:Domestic Mobilization? | 第165-166页 |
| 3.4 Rivalry Terination,1965:Internal Shock and Dispute Settlement | 第166-169页 |
| 3.5 Conclusion | 第169-171页 |
| 4. Kashmir and the Pakistan-India Rivalry | 第171-208页 |
| 4.1 Introduction | 第171-172页 |
| 4.2 Uses of Force,1964 and 1965:India's 1962 Defeat and Pakistan's New Risk Calculations | 第172-194页 |
| 4.2.1 Indian Deterrence and Pakistan's Diplomatic Strategies,1949-1962 | 第174-179页 |
| 4.2.2 Window of Opportunity and War,1962-1965 | 第179-193页 |
| 4.2.3 Assessing an Alternative Explanation:Negative Power Shift? | 第193-194页 |
| 4.3 Bangladesh and the Simla Agreement,1971:Domestic Sources of Rivalry Maintenanceamidst Defeat | 第194-197页 |
| 4.4 Scramble for the Siachen Glacier,1984-87:Security Dilemma becomes Confict Spiral | 第197-201页 |
| 4.5 The Kargil War,1998.1999:Testing Pakistan's New Nuclear Calculus | 第201-207页 |
| 4.5.1 Miscalculations and Pakistan's Escalation | 第201-203页 |
| 4.5.2 Explaining Pakistan's Calculations:Domestic Pressures and Window of Opportunity | 第203-205页 |
| 4.5.3 Assessing an Alternative Explanation:Declining Claim Strength? | 第205-207页 |
| 4.6 Conclusion | 第207-208页 |
| 5. The China-Soviet Union Rivalry and Border Dispute | 第208-234页 |
| 5.1 Introduction | 第208-209页 |
| 5.2 Intensifying Rivalry and China's Border Settlements with Third Parties,1962-1963 | 第209-216页 |
| 5.2.1 China's Settlements with Mongolia,North Korea,and Afghanistan | 第210-213页 |
| 5.2.2 Assessing Competing Explanations:Rivalry or Frontier Unrest? | 第213-216页 |
| 5.3 Border Tensions and Escalation,1960-1969:Rivalry, Domestic Pressures, and Miscalculation | 第216-227页 |
| 5.3.1 Failure of Negotiations,1964 | 第218-221页 |
| 5.3.2 Border Tensions,Military Build-up,and the Brezhnev Doctrine,1964-1969 | 第221-222页 |
| 5.3.3 Clash at Zhenbao Island,March 1969 | 第222-224页 |
| 5.3.4 Assessing Competing Explanations for China's Escalation:Rivalry or Domestic Politics? | 第224-227页 |
| 5.4 Rivalry Termination and Compromise,1986-1992 | 第227-230页 |
| 5.5 Assessing Competing Explanations for the USSR's Compromise:External Threat or Regime Instability? | 第230-232页 |
| 5.6 Conclusion | 第232-234页 |
| 6. Border and Maritime Disputes in the China-Vietnam Rivalry | 第234-269页 |
| 6.1 Introduction | 第234-237页 |
| 6.2 Common Threats,Compromise and Non-escalation,1950-1973 | 第237-240页 |
| 6.3 Rivalry,Escalation and China's Seizure of the Paracels,1974 | 第240-248页 |
| 6.3.1 Alternative Explanations:Territorial Value or Negative Power Shift? | 第247-248页 |
| 6.4 Rivalry,the Land Border,and 1979 Punitive Invasion | 第248-254页 |
| 6.5 Rivalry and Competition for the Spratlys,1975-1989 | 第254-262页 |
| 6.5.1 Alternative Explanation:Negative Power Shift? | 第261-262页 |
| 6.6 Rivalry Termination and Partial Dispute Resolution,1989-present | 第262-269页 |
| 7. Conclusion | 第269-274页 |
| Works Cited | 第274-296页 |
