| 中文摘要 | 第7-12页 |
| Abstract | 第12-18页 |
| Chapter 1: Introduction | 第19-42页 |
| 1.1 Rationale of the study | 第19-24页 |
| 1.1.1 Defining Environmental Protection as a Global Public Good | 第20-21页 |
| 1.1.2 Global Public Goods for global environmental issues | 第21-22页 |
| 1.1.3 Relevance for international cooperation | 第22-24页 |
| 1.2 Philosophical argument of thesis | 第24-26页 |
| 1.2.1 Interplay among the Global,Public and Local societies for Global Public Good | 第24-26页 |
| 1.3 Theoretical Stance | 第26-28页 |
| 1.4 Critical analysis of Policy Discourse | 第28-31页 |
| 1.4.1 Benefits of Environmental Global Public Goods at Different scales | 第30-31页 |
| 1.5 Introduction to Central Concepts | 第31-39页 |
| 1.5.1 International Agreements for the protection of the Environment | 第33-36页 |
| 1.5.2 Institutional design | 第36-38页 |
| 1.5.3 Some principal for designing an institution | 第38-39页 |
| 1.6 Research Questions | 第39页 |
| 1.7 Study Objective | 第39页 |
| 1.8 Chapters Outlines | 第39-42页 |
| Chapter 2: The Literature background and Critiques | 第42-49页 |
| 2.1 Introduction | 第42页 |
| 2.2 Literature review | 第42-44页 |
| 2.2.1 Environment as a global public good:Literature background | 第42-44页 |
| 2.3 A literature of the Mechanisms Adopted to Increase the Effectiveness of the Provision of Global Public Goods | 第44-48页 |
| Conclusion | 第48-49页 |
| Chapter 3: Formulation of Game Theoretic Modeling for Climate Change | 第49-55页 |
| 3.1 Coalitional structure for two stage game | 第49-51页 |
| 3.2 Stability of the coalition | 第51-54页 |
| Conclusion | 第54-55页 |
| Chapter 4: Cost Allocation for the Problem of Pollution Reduction.A Dynamic Cooperative Game Approach | 第55-71页 |
| 4.1 Introduction | 第55-58页 |
| 4.2 Dynamic Game Model | 第58-61页 |
| 4.2.0 The Nash Equilibrium | 第59-60页 |
| 4.2.1 Value Function | 第60-61页 |
| 4.3 Cooperative Solution of the Emission Reduction Game Model | 第61-64页 |
| 4.3.1 All Possible Coalition Outcomes | 第63-64页 |
| 4.4 Shapley Value Computation | 第64-65页 |
| 4.5 Allocation of the Shapley value | 第65-70页 |
| Conclusion | 第70-71页 |
| Chapter 5: Empirical Background of the Game Theoretic Modeling | 第71-104页 |
| 5.1 Introduction | 第71页 |
| 5.2 Emissions and Concentration | 第71-73页 |
| 5.3 Global Damage Cost Function | 第73-74页 |
| 5.4 Global and regional benefit Functions | 第74-77页 |
| 5.5 Derivation of Abatement Cost Functions | 第77-79页 |
| 5.6 The singleton coalition and grand coalition | 第79-80页 |
| 5.7 Stable Coalitions without Commitments | 第80-89页 |
| 5.8 Stable Coalitions under Commitments | 第89-96页 |
| 5.9 Imperfect Coalitions | 第96-104页 |
| Chapter 6: Policy Implications,Future Research and Conclusion | 第104-111页 |
| 6.1 Introduction | 第104页 |
| 6.2 Policy Implications and Discussions | 第104-108页 |
| 6.3 Directions for Further Research | 第108-111页 |
| References | 第111-120页 |
| Appendix | 第120-129页 |
| 学位论文评阅及答辩情况表 | 第129页 |
