| 摘要 | 第4-7页 |
| Abstract | 第7-10页 |
| Abbreviations | 第11-14页 |
| CHAPTER I: Introduction | 第14-19页 |
| 1.1 Russia-Georgian Relations: Historical Review | 第14-16页 |
| 1.2 Research Questions | 第16页 |
| 1.3 Research Argument | 第16-17页 |
| 1.4 Theoretical Approach | 第17页 |
| 1.5 Methodology | 第17页 |
| 1.6 Data sources | 第17-18页 |
| 1.7 Outline of the chapters | 第18-19页 |
| Chapter II: The outline of Russian-Georgia relations after the SovietUnion disintegration | 第19-36页 |
| 2.1“Ups and downs”period 19912003 | 第19-23页 |
| 2.2 Rose Revolution as“critical point”and role of Saakashvili in it | 第23-29页 |
| 2.3“Roller coaster”bilateral relations: the outbreak of two countriesfrom 2003 to 2007 | 第29-36页 |
| CHAPTER III: The reasons for Russia’s adoption of Economic Statecraftpolicy towards Georgia | 第36-45页 |
| 3.1 Georgia’s position between Russia and the West | 第36-38页 |
| 3.2 Russian interest in Georgia: why Georgia matters | 第38-39页 |
| 3.3 The limitations of military and political tools of Russia and its’ economic tools advantage | 第39-45页 |
| 3.3.1 Economic factor | 第41-45页 |
| CHAPTER IV: Economic Statecraft as Russian FP tool towards Georgia | 第45-53页 |
| 4.1 Contents and techniques of Economic Statecraft | 第45-47页 |
| 4.2 Russian statecraft policy towards Georgia | 第47-51页 |
| 4.3 Achievements and consequences of ES | 第51-53页 |
| Chapter V: Conclusion | 第53-56页 |
| 5.1 Conclusion | 第53-54页 |
| 5.2 Recommendations | 第54-56页 |
| Bibliography | 第56-60页 |
