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孟加拉国本地政府官员与官僚在团队合作效率方面的互补关系:多利益相关者视角

摘要第5-7页
ABSTRACT第7-9页
Abbreviation第14-18页
Chapter 1 Introduction and Background of the Study第18-60页
    1.1 Statement of the Issue第18-23页
    1.2 Political Experimentation over Local Government in Bangladesh第23-28页
        1.2.1 Pre-British Era第23页
        1.2.2 British Era第23-24页
        1.2.3 Pakistan Era第24-25页
        1.2.4 Bangladesh Era第25-28页
    1.3 Historical Development of Field Administration in Bangladesh第28-34页
        1.3.1 The British Period (1600-1947)第28-30页
        1.3.2 The Pakistan Period (1947-1971)第30-31页
        1.3.3 The Bangladesh Period (1971-2019)第31-34页
    1.4 Local Administration Team of Bangladesh第34-45页
        1.4.1 Politicians第35-42页
        1.4.2 Bureaucrats第42-45页
    1.5 Nature and Scope of the UZP Team Performances第45-53页
    1.6 Scope of the Study第53-55页
    1.7 Objectives and Research Questions of the Study第55-56页
    1.8 Structure of the Dissertation第56-60页
Chapter 2 Literature Review第60-78页
    2.1 Politics-Bureaucracy Interface第60-65页
        2.1.1 Politics-Administration Dichotomy(1887)第61-63页
        2.1.2 Mutual-Interactive Model of Relationship(1970s)第63页
        2.1.3 The Adversarial Model(1987)第63-64页
        2.1.4 Complementarity Model (1998)第64-65页
    2.2 Findings through Previous Literatures第65-74页
    2.3 Significance of the Study第74-78页
Chapter 3 Theoretical Background and Conceptualization第78-112页
    3.1 Theoretical Framework第78-89页
        3.1.1 Tuckman's Stages of Team Development(1965)第78-80页
        3.1.2 Beckhard's GRPI Model of Team Effectiveness(1972)第80-84页
        3.1.3 Lencioni's Team Dysfunctional Model (2002)第84-89页
    3.2 Conceptualization of the Study Variables第89-112页
        3.2.1 Role Ambiguity第89-91页
        3.2.2 Mutual Dependence第91-93页
        3.2.3 Role Conflict第93-95页
        3.2.4 Mutual Trust第95-97页
        3.2.5 Organizational Commitment第97-98页
        3.2.6 Procedural Justice第98-101页
        3.2.7 Team Effectiveness第101-102页
        3.2.8 Legislation and Policies第102-108页
        3.2.9 Education第108-112页
Chapter 4 Methodology第112-132页
    4.1 Philosophical Standpoints of the Study第112-117页
        4.1.1 Ontological Perspective第112-113页
        4.1.2 Epistemological Perspective第113页
        4.1.3 Explanatory Inference第113-114页
        4.1.4 Deductive Approach第114-115页
        4.1.5 Research Design- Logic of Selecting Triangulation Approach第115-117页
    4.2 Determination of Sample Size第117-123页
        4.2.1 Politicians and Bureaucrats Perspective第117-121页
        4.2.2 Citizen's Perspective第121-123页
    4.3 Data Collection Methods第123-126页
        4.3.1 Structured Questionnaire for Quantitative Field Survey第123-125页
        4.3.2 Semi-structured Questionnaire for Qualitative Interview第125-126页
    4.4 Data Analyzing Methods第126-129页
        4.4.1 Quantitative Data Analyzing through PLS-SEM第126-127页
        4.4.2 Qualitative Data Analyzing through Data Analysis Spiral第127-129页
    4.5 Validity and Reliability第129-132页
        4.5.1 Validity and Reliability for Quantitative Survey第129-131页
        4.5.2 Validity and Reliability for Qualitative Survey第131-132页
Chapter 5 Politico-Bureaucratic Relationships towards TeamEffectiveness: Politicians and Bureaucrats Perspectives第132-162页
    5.1 Demographic Features of the Sample Respondents第132-134页
    5.2 Results of Quantitative Data Analysis第134页
    5.3 Measurement Model第134-141页
        5.3.1 Convergent Validity第135-137页
        5.3.2 Indicator Reliability第137-138页
        5.3.3 Discriminant Validity第138-141页
    5.4 Structural Model第141-148页
        5.4.1 Multicollinearity Assessment of Structural Model第141-142页
        5.4.2 Path Co-efficient and T-statistics Value第142-144页
        5.4.3 Measuring the Value of R~2第144页
        5.4.4 Effect Size f第144-145页
        5.4.5 Model's Predictive Relevance (Q2)第145-147页
        5.4.6 Assessment of Fit第147-148页
    5.5 Moderating Effects第148-162页
        5.5.1 Path Co-efficient Results with Total Effects第150-152页
        5.5.2 Measuring the Value of R~2 and Effect Size f~2 with Moderating Effects第152页
        5.5.3 Model's Predictive Relevance (Q2) with Moderating Effects第152-154页
        5.5.4 Model Fit with Moderating Effects第154-155页
        5.5.5 Simple Slope Plot Analysis第155-162页
Chapter 6 Politico-Bureaucratic Relationships towards TeamEffectiveness: Citizen's Perspectives第162-176页
    6.1 Demographic Features of the Respondents第162-164页
    6.2 Results of Qualitative Data Analysis第164-176页
        6.2.1 Relationships between Politicians and Bureaucrats第164-165页
        6.2.2 Factors Associated with Conflicts between Politicians and Bureaucrats第165-166页
        6.2.3 Role of MP over the UZP under UZP Amendment Act 2009&2011第166-167页
        6.2.4 Issues that Associated with Conflicts between MP and UZPC第167-168页
        6.2.5 Role of Less-Educated Team Members on UZP Performances第168-169页
        6.2.6 Role of Partisan Elected Politicians at the UZP第169-170页
        6.2.7 Partisan Elected Leader's Role in Team Effectiveness第170-171页
        6.2.8 More Conflicting Pairs of Relationships at the UZP第171-173页
        6.2.9 Citizen's Recommendations towards Team Effectiveness at the UZP第173-176页
Chapter 7 Discussion and Conclusion第176-204页
    7.1 Introduction第176页
    7.2 Summary of the Findings第176-181页
        7.2.1 Politicians and Bureaucrats Perspectives第176-179页
        7.2.2 Citizen's Perspective第179-181页
    7.3 Theoretical Contributions第181-184页
    7.4 Practical Contributions第184-196页
        7.4.1 Role Ambiguity and Team Effectiveness第184-185页
        7.4.2 Mutual Dependence and Team Effectiveness第185-187页
        7.4.3 Role Conflict and Team Effectiveness第187-189页
        7.4.4 Mutual Trust and Team Effectiveness第189-190页
        7.4.5 Organizational Commitment and Team Effectiveness第190-191页
        7.4.6 Procedural Justice and Team effectiveness第191-193页
        7.4.7 Role of Legislation and Policies as Moderator第193-195页
        7.4.8 Role of Education as Moderator第195-196页
    7.5 Limitations and Future Research第196-198页
    7.6 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations第198-204页
References第204-232页
Appendix第232-242页
    Appendix 1: Survey Questionnaire for the politicians & the bureaucrats第232-235页
    Appendix 2: Interview Questionnaire for the Citizen第235-237页
    Appendix 3: Functions of Upazila Parishad第237-238页
    Appendix 4: Revenue Sources of Upazila Parishad第238-239页
    Appendix 5: Name of the standing committee of Upazila Parishad第239页
    Appendix 6: Functions of Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO)第239-241页
    Appendix 7: Criterion for block grant allocation in sector wise第241-242页
Acknowledgement第242-244页
Academic Articles and Research Outcomes in Study Period第244页

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