| Abstract | 第1-10页 |
| 1 Introduction | 第10-20页 |
| ·Motivation | 第10-16页 |
| ·Approach | 第16页 |
| ·Some Underlying Assumptions | 第16页 |
| ·Some Novel Features of The Thesis | 第16-18页 |
| ·Structure of the Thesis | 第18-20页 |
| 2 An Evaluative Survey of the Literature | 第20-35页 |
| ·Transaction Cost Economics | 第20-24页 |
| ·Law and finance | 第24-29页 |
| ·New Theory of Soft-Budget Constraint | 第29-31页 |
| ·Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis | 第31-33页 |
| ·Conclusion | 第33-35页 |
| 3 Reputation Rents, Social Trust and Organizational Forms | 第35-72页 |
| ·Introduction | 第35-40页 |
| ·A pyramid model of social trust | 第40-43页 |
| ·Further Analysis | 第43-45页 |
| ·Determinants of Organizational Forms | 第45-52页 |
| ·Intermediaries and Organizational Forms | 第45-46页 |
| ·Committing governments and Organizational Forms | 第46-47页 |
| ·Religion, Culture, and Organizational Forms | 第47-48页 |
| ·Law and Organizational Forms | 第48-49页 |
| ·Equilibrium Organizational Forms in Perspective | 第49-52页 |
| ·Extension and Evidence | 第52-67页 |
| ·Main Banks and Hausbanks as Reputation Resorts | 第52-57页 |
| ·Ownership of Firms in East Asia | 第57-61页 |
| ·Empirics of Law and Finance | 第61-65页 |
| ·Empirics of Social Trust, Organizational Size and Economic Performance | 第65-67页 |
| ·Policy Implications for China | 第67-69页 |
| ·Problems of Organizations and Intermediaries | 第67-68页 |
| ·Government | 第68-69页 |
| ·Conclusion | 第69-72页 |
| 4 Decentralization, Commitment and Organizational Forms | 第72-112页 |
| ·Introduction | 第72-76页 |
| ·The Basic Model | 第76-81页 |
| ·Further Analysis | 第81-84页 |
| ·Extensions and Evidence | 第84-102页 |
| ·Personal Exchange versus Market Exchange | 第85-86页 |
| ·China’s Opening Door Policy and its Effects on Social Rules | 第86-87页 |
| ·Decentralization and Fiscal Federalism in China | 第87-90页 |
| ·Social Capital and Social Trust Reconsidered | 第90-91页 |
| ·Chaebols in South Korea | 第91-95页 |
| ·Embedded Relationships in Japan | 第95-101页 |
| ·Moral Orient versus Rational Occident | 第101-102页 |
| ·Implications with particular applications to China | 第102-108页 |
| ·Political Decentralization | 第102-103页 |
| ·Decentralization of Financial System | 第103-105页 |
| ·Integration of Domestic Market | 第105-106页 |
| ·Social Integration | 第106-108页 |
| ·Conclusion | 第108-110页 |
| Appendix A4.1 | 第110-112页 |
| 5 Division of Labor, Commitment and Organizational Forms | 第112-153页 |
| ·Introduction | 第112-115页 |
| ·The Basic Model | 第115-119页 |
| ·Further Analysis | 第119-122页 |
| ·Extensions and Evidence | 第122-146页 |
| ·Moral Society versus Rational Society | 第122-123页 |
| ·Limited Commitment and Ex Ante Information Collection | 第123-124页 |
| ·Division of Labor, Law and Organizational Forms | 第124-134页 |
| ·Globalization Reconsidered | 第134-135页 |
| ·Constitution and Commitment in Seventeenth Century England | 第135-137页 |
| ·Corruption and Growth | 第137-146页 |
| ·Implications with Special Applications to China | 第146-147页 |
| ·The Protections of Property Rights | 第146页 |
| ·The Commitment of Government and Constitutional Reform | 第146页 |
| ·Rule of Law | 第146-147页 |
| ·Conclusion | 第147-149页 |
| Appendix A5.1 | 第149-153页 |
| 6 Concluding Remarks | 第153-309页 |
| ·Taking Stock | 第153-156页 |
| ·Social Reputation Hierarchy | 第153-154页 |
| ·Decentralization | 第154-155页 |
| ·Division of Labor | 第155-156页 |
| ·Looking Ahead | 第156-309页 |
| ·The Internal Structure of Organizations | 第156-159页 |
| ·Vertical Social Structure versus Horizontal Social Structure | 第159-161页 |
| ·Law versus Social Norm | 第161页 |
| ·Common versus Continental Law | 第161-162页 |
| ·Incorporating More Social Elements into Analysis | 第162-164页 |
| ·Implications For Political Economy | 第164-165页 |
| ·The Relations to Economic Growth | 第165-166页 |
| ·Implications for Globalization | 第166-167页 |
| ·More Empirics Needed | 第167页 |
| ·Other Perspectives | 第167-309页 |
| Reference | 第309-182页 |
| Acknowledgement | 第182-324页 |
