Chapter 1 Introduction | 第1-38页 |
1.The Origins and Development of the Subject | 第13-15页 |
2.The Reasons for Choosing the Subject: Its Significance and Relevance | 第15-16页 |
3.Definition of Terms and Scope of Study | 第16-20页 |
·Definition of Terms | 第16-19页 |
·Scope of Study | 第19-20页 |
4.Literature Review | 第20-27页 |
5.What Is New and Different in This Research? | 第27-29页 |
·Thesis of the Paper | 第27-28页 |
·Thesis Contribution and Limitation | 第28-29页 |
6.Theory---Foreign Policy Decision-making Models | 第29-36页 |
·The Rational Actor Model | 第29-30页 |
·The Bureaucratic Politics Model | 第30-31页 |
·The Organization Process Model | 第31-32页 |
·Congressional Approach: Theories of Congressional Behavior | 第32-34页 |
·The Political Process Model | 第34-35页 |
·The Inter-branch Politics Model | 第35-36页 |
7.Methodology | 第36-37页 |
8.Layout of the Paper | 第37-38页 |
Chapter 2 Constitutional and Legal Framework of War Power and the Struggle over Interpretation | 第38-62页 |
1.Constitutional Framework | 第38-48页 |
·Constitutional Allocation of War Power | 第38-41页 |
·The Intent of the Framers | 第41-46页 |
·Why and How the Struggles Arise | 第46-48页 |
2. International Treaties | 第48-56页 |
·UN Charter and UN Participation Act | 第48-52页 |
·Mutual-defense Treaties | 第52-56页 |
3.The War Powers Resolution | 第56-59页 |
·Major Provisions | 第56-58页 |
·Presidential Compliance and Non-compliance | 第58-59页 |
4.The Attitude of the Judiciary | 第59-62页 |
Chapter 3 Early Practice till the Beginning of WWII: from Congressional Dominance to Presidential Initiative | 第62-92页 |
1.Framers’War Power Practice: Congressional Dominance (George Washington to James Monroe) | 第62-69页 |
2.War Power in Evolution (post-Monroe 19~(th) century) | 第69-76页 |
3.Presidential Initiatives and Congressional Acquiescence (1900--WWII) | 第76-92页 |
·Presidential Initiatives and Congressional Acquiescence: Interventions in Latin America | 第79-82页 |
·Formal Assertion of Presidential War Power yet Respect for Congress:Woodrow Wilson and WWI | 第82-86页 |
·Bypassing Congress: Roosevelt and WWII | 第86-92页 |
Chapter 4 From Korea to the War Powers Resolution: from Presidential Expansion to Congressional Reassertion | 第92-132页 |
1.The Korean War: Congress Ignored | 第94-103页 |
2.The Blank Check Resolutions: All “According to His Best Judgment” | 第103-115页 |
·The Formosa (Taiwan) Resolution | 第104-106页 |
·The Middle East Resolution | 第106-109页 |
·The Cuba Resolution | 第109-111页 |
·The Tonkin Gulf Resolution | 第111-115页 |
3.The Vietnam War: from Congressional Deference to Congressional Resurgence | 第115-126页 |
4.The War Powers Resolution: to Check Presidential War Power | 第126-132页 |
Chapter 5 War Power Struggle after the War Powers Resolution: Presidential Dominance Largely Unchecked | 第132-205页 |
1.Presidential Unilateral Decisions: Consultation as Notification or No Consultation at All | 第133-143页 |
·The Mayaguez Recapture | 第133-136页 |
·Iran Hostage Rescue Attempt | 第136-138页 |
·Air Strikes against Libya | 第138-140页 |
·The Invasion of Panama | 第140-142页 |
·Air Strikes against Baghdad | 第142-143页 |
2.Congressional Attempts to Enforce the War Powers Resolution: More Failures than Successes | 第143-155页 |
·Lebanon | 第144-148页 |
·The Invasion of Grenada | 第148-150页 |
·Persian Gulf Operations against Iran | 第150-155页 |
3.Unilateral Presidential Decisions with UN or NATO Sanction but not Congressional Approval | 第155-182页 |
·Somalia | 第157-161页 |
·Haiti | 第161-167页 |
·Bosnia | 第167-174页 |
·Kosovo | 第174-182页 |
4.Congressional Support but not Approval | 第182-202页 |
·Persian Gulf War | 第183-191页 |
·War on Terrorism and Afghanistan | 第191-196页 |
·The Iraq War | 第196-202页 |
5.Presidential Compliance and Non-compliance: a Summary | 第202-205页 |
Chapter 6 Conclusion | 第205-221页 |
1.The Expansion of Presidential War Power: Phases, Causes, and Means | 第205-212页 |
2.The Patterns of Interplay in War Decision-making and the Relevant Variables | 第212-216页 |
3.The Nature and Future of War Power Struggle | 第216-221页 |
Bibliography | 第221-233页 |