| 摘要 | 第7-9页 |
| Abstract | 第9页 |
| 1.Introduction | 第10-13页 |
| 2.Critiques of Two Contending and Competing Theories | 第13-24页 |
| 2.1 Critique of Utilitarianism:Serious Limitations of Utility | 第14-17页 |
| 2.2 Critique of Rawls' "Justice as Fairness":Inadequacy of "Primary Goods" | 第17-24页 |
| 3.A Defense of the Capabilities Approach | 第24-39页 |
| 3.1 Capabilities:Proper Space for Human Development and Social Justice | 第24页 |
| 3.2 Core Ideas, Insights, and Concepts | 第24-39页 |
| 3.2.1 Capabilities, Functionings, and Conversion Factors | 第24-26页 |
| 3.2.2 Freedoms:Negative, Positive, and Substantial | 第26-30页 |
| 3.2.3 Democracy:Importance of the Deliberative and Participatory Process | 第30-32页 |
| 3.2.4 Ethical Individualism | 第32-36页 |
| 3.2.5 Informational Basis and Interpersonal Comparisons | 第36-37页 |
| 3.2.6 A Diagrammatic Representation Worth a Thousand Words | 第37-39页 |
| 4.Two Versions of the Capabilities Approach:Sen vs. Nussbaum | 第39-64页 |
| 4.1 Sen:The Case for Deliberate and Assertive Incompleteness | 第39-45页 |
| 4.1.1 Concepts of Capabilities and Functionings | 第39-40页 |
| 4.1.2 Basic and General or Complex Capabilities | 第40-41页 |
| 4.1.3 Capabilities as Substantial Freedoms | 第41页 |
| 4.1.4 Two Crucial Distinctions:Agency/Well-Being, Freedom/Achievement | 第41-45页 |
| 4.1.5 Two Reasons for Incompleteness:Toward a General, yet Flexible Framework | 第45页 |
| 4.2 Nussbaum:The Case for a Partial Theory of(Global)Social Justice | 第45-54页 |
| 4.2.1 Concepts of Capabilities and Functionings | 第45-46页 |
| 4.2.2 Basic, Internal, and Combined Capabilities | 第46-47页 |
| 4.2.3 Centrality of Practical Reason | 第47-49页 |
| 4.2.4 Defense and Justification of a Proposed List of Capabilities | 第49-51页 |
| 4.2.5 More on the List and Its Rationale:Toward a Theory of Justice | 第51-54页 |
| 4.3 A Critical Comparative Evaluation | 第54-64页 |
| 4.3.1 Disagreement over a List of Capabilities | 第55-58页 |
| 4.3.2 Disagreement over the Concept of Capabilities | 第58-59页 |
| 4.3.3 Robeyns'Partisan Argument:For Sen, Against Nussbaum | 第59-64页 |
| 4.3.3.1 On the List:To Have One or Not? | 第59-61页 |
| 4.3.3.2 On Criteria of Selection and the Question of Legitimacy | 第61-64页 |
| 5.Objections and Counter-Objections | 第64-79页 |
| 5.1 First Objection:Comprehensive Conception of the Good | 第64-65页 |
| 5.2 Counter-Objection to 5.1 | 第65-69页 |
| 5.3 Second Objection:Public Criterion | 第69-71页 |
| 5.4 Counter-Objection to 5.3 | 第71-73页 |
| 5.5 Further Counter-Objection to 5.3:Methodological and Operational Requirements of the Capabilities Approach | 第73-78页 |
| 5.6 Third Possible Objection:Subjectivism, and Rebuttal | 第78-79页 |
| 6.Prospects:Towards a More "Capable" Approach | 第79-93页 |
| 6.1 Centrality and Multidimensionality | 第79-80页 |
| 6.2 Inter- and Multi-disciplinarity | 第80-81页 |
| 6.3 Flexibility, Plurality and Diversity | 第81页 |
| 6.4 Political Liberalism-Reconsidered and Reconceived | 第81-85页 |
| 6.5 Excursus:Nation-States, Globalization, Well-off & Harmonious Societies | 第85-88页 |
| 6.6 Universalism and Global Justice | 第88-93页 |
| 7.Conclusion | 第93-94页 |
| REFERENCES | 第94-99页 |
| Postscript & Acknowledgements | 第99-100页 |
| 学位论文评阅及答辩情况表 | 第100页 |
