Part Ⅰ Questions and Methods | 第1-11页 |
·Background | 第8-9页 |
·Research questions | 第9页 |
·Approaches | 第9-10页 |
·Overview | 第10-11页 |
Part Ⅱ Introduction | 第11-17页 |
·Climate change science | 第11页 |
·The process of global climate change negotiation | 第11-16页 |
a. Beginning phase,1988-1992 | 第12-13页 |
b. Staggering phase,1993-2001 | 第13-15页 |
c. Phase of breakdown and breakthrough,2002- | 第15-16页 |
·Commitments under the Framework Convention and Kyoto Protocol | 第16-17页 |
a. Annex Ⅰ and non-Annex Ⅰ countries | 第16-17页 |
b. Kyoto mechanisms | 第17页 |
Part Ⅲ Blocs in the Global Climate Negotiations | 第17-35页 |
·Key issues in controversy | 第18-21页 |
a. Scientific uncertainties | 第18-19页 |
b. Spatial difference of climate change impact and remoteness of mitigation benefits | 第19-20页 |
c. Cost-benefit considerations | 第20-21页 |
·Negotiating blocs | 第21-35页 |
·Annex Ⅰ countries | 第21-31页 |
·G77 plus China | 第31-35页 |
Part Ⅳ International Cooperation and International Regime: A Theoretical Perspective | 第35-46页 |
·Neorealism | 第35-39页 |
·Neoliberal institutionalism | 第39-43页 |
·International regimes,international cooperation and collective action | 第43-46页 |
Part Ⅴ Game-theoretical Analysis | 第46-67页 |
·North-South squabble:a fairness concern | 第47-58页 |
·Boxed pigs | 第47-49页 |
·Fairness concerns as a game of Boxed pigs | 第49-51页 |
·Prisoner's Dilemma | 第51-52页 |
·American defection as a game of Prisoner's Dilemma | 第52-58页 |
·North-North faction:fight for quota | 第58-63页 |
·Fight of the Sexes | 第58-60页 |
·Quota distribution as the Fight of the Sexes | 第60-63页 |
·South-South contradiction:a traitor's dilemma | 第63-67页 |
·Stag Hunt | 第63-65页 |
·Argentine voluntary commitment as a game of Stag Hunt | 第65-67页 |
Part Ⅵ Conclusion:Factors at Work and the Prospect of Kyoto Protocol | 第67-79页 |