ABSTRACT | 第2页 |
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT | 第3-7页 |
INTRODUCTION | 第7-16页 |
1. Background | 第7-8页 |
2. Research Purpose | 第8-9页 |
3. Research Questions | 第9页 |
4. Literature Review | 第9-13页 |
5. Methodology | 第13页 |
6. Research Structure | 第13-16页 |
CHAPTER I: COERCIVE DIPLOMACY | 第16-30页 |
1.1. Power and Security Line in the International Politics | 第16-17页 |
1.2. Coercive Strategies to Deal with Conflicts | 第17-19页 |
1.3. The Concept of Coercive Diplomacy | 第19-30页 |
1.3.1. The Logic of Coercive Diplomacy | 第22-25页 |
1.3.2. Dynamic Variables of Coercive Diplomacy | 第25-27页 |
1.3.3. Possible Issues in Implementing Coercive Diplomacy | 第27-30页 |
CHAPTER II: COERCIVE IDEOLOGIES IN CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY | 第30-38页 |
2.1. The Chinese Foreign Policy Stance | 第31-35页 |
2.2. Coercive Tendency in Chinese Strategic Culture | 第35-37页 |
2.3.“Assertiveness”Phenomenon in Chinese Foreign Policy | 第37-38页 |
CHAPTER III: MARITIME DELIMITATION IN SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES | 第38-63页 |
3.1. Maritime Delimitation and International Law of the Sea | 第39-46页 |
3.2. South China Sea Territorial Delimitation Disputes | 第46-53页 |
3.2.1. China’s Historical Claims over the South China Sea | 第50-52页 |
3.2.2. China’s Physical Claims over the South China Sea | 第52-53页 |
3.3. Chinese Foreign Policy in the South China Sea Disputes | 第53-63页 |
3.3.1. China’s“Core”Interest over the South China Sea | 第58-60页 |
3.3.2. Modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy | 第60-63页 |
CHAPTER IV: A CASE STUDY: CHINA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN THEHUANGYAN ISLAND CRISIS | 第63-71页 |
4.1. Conflicting Claims Over the Huangyan Island | 第63-64页 |
4.2. The Process of Huangyan Island Crisis | 第64-68页 |
4.2.1 Descriptive Explanation of the Crisis | 第65-66页 |
4.2.2 How China and the Philippines Managed the Crisis | 第66-68页 |
4.3 Prospects and Assessment | 第68-71页 |
4.3.1 The Prospects of the Huangyan Island Issue | 第68-69页 |
4.3.2. The Implications of China’s Coercive Diplomacy | 第69-71页 |
CONCLUSION | 第71-74页 |
BIBLIOGRAPHY | 第74-89页 |