| AKNOWLEDGEMENT | 第3-4页 |
| ABSTRACT | 第4页 |
| LIST OF ACRONYMS | 第8-9页 |
| CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION | 第9-15页 |
| CHAPTER 2. PARTICIPATION IN THE MAKING OF & PRESERVATION BY THE AMLOF THE MULTIPLE ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES | 第15-42页 |
| 2.1 The scattered state of pre-AML China's competition laws before 2007 | 第15-24页 |
| 2.1.1 The Coexistence of multiple regislations | 第15-18页 |
| 2.1.2 The limited power of the many (non-)enforcers | 第18-24页 |
| 2.2 The long and thoughtful drafting of the AML | 第24-34页 |
| 2.2.1 The legislative process behind the AML | 第24-27页 |
| 2.2.2 The hesitations on the provisions to include in the AM | 第27-34页 |
| 2.2.2.1 The choice of an inclusive antitust, free, and fair competition law | 第27-29页 |
| 2.2.2.2 The difficulty to address the issue of administrative monopolies | 第29-31页 |
| 2.2.2.3 The impossible nomination of a strong enforcement body | 第31-34页 |
| 2.3. Critical assessment of the state of the literature on AML enforcement | 第34-42页 |
| 2.3.1. The cast of doubts about the structural capacities set up by the AML | 第34-38页 |
| 2.3.2. The ignorance of later developments in the implementation | 第38-42页 |
| CHAPTER 3. THE DISSEMINATION OF ENFORCEMENT POWERS AT VARIOUSLEVELS | 第42-61页 |
| 3.1 The necessary supplementation of national agencies provincial level | 第42-50页 |
| 3.1.1 Practical limits to the power of the central organizations | 第43-45页 |
| 3.1.2 The supervision of local agents in a Tiao relationship-organization | 第45-50页 |
| 3.2 The increasing participation of the local administrations | 第50-55页 |
| 3.2.1 The SAIC and the NDRC:two different models of participation | 第50-52页 |
| 3.2.2 The particular case of merger reviews conducted by MOFCOM | 第52-53页 |
| 3.2.3 The "professionalization" of the enforcement agencies | 第53-55页 |
| 3.3 The geographic divergences created by a decentalized system | 第55-61页 |
| 3.3.1 The uneven geographic repartition of law enforcement activities | 第55-58页 |
| 3.3.2 The management of local resources | 第58-61页 |
| CHAPTER 4. NDRC & SAIC:CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES,DIVERGENT DECISIONS | 第61-78页 |
| 4.1 Redundancy and discrepancies in administrative decisions | 第61-66页 |
| 4.1.1 Overlaps between the SAIC's and NDRC's investigations | 第61-64页 |
| 4.1.2 A stricter State control in price cases? | 第64-66页 |
| 4.2 Administrative variations of procedural rules | 第66-70页 |
| 4.2.1. An example:divergences in leniency provisions | 第66-68页 |
| 4.2.2. Courts' interventions:complement to or threat against administrative decisions? | 第68-70页 |
| 4.3 Division of power,and contradictory objectives | 第70-78页 |
| 4.3.1 The effect-based division of powers:a source of inefficiencies | 第70-72页 |
| 4.3.2 Contradictory objectives:NDRC's focus on ordinary people and SAIC's argument in favor of the industry | 第72-76页 |
| 4.3.3 The "competition tool",a means towards different ends | 第76-78页 |
| CHAPTER 5. CONVERGENCE IN THE MPLEMENTATION OF ANTITRUST POLICIESPROSPECTS & RECOMMENDATIONS | 第78-92页 |
| 5.1 Raising awareness and diffusing a common interpretation of the law | 第78-81页 |
| 5.2 Building connections with other major economic agents | 第81-85页 |
| 5.3 Reforming the enforcement institutions | 第85-92页 |
| 5.3.1 Developing oversight mechanisms | 第85-88页 |
| 5.3.2 The revision of the role of the NDRC | 第88-92页 |
| CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION | 第92-101页 |
| APPENDICES | 第101-120页 |
| APPENDIX A. China's Anti-Monopoly Law of 2007 | 第101-114页 |
| APPENDIX B. Summary of the cases reported and filed by the NDRC since 2008 | 第114-116页 |
| APPENDIX C. Summary of the cases reported and filed by the SAIC since 2008 | 第116-118页 |
| APPENDIX D. Lawsuits under the AML processed between 2008 and 2012 | 第118-119页 |
| APPENDIX E. Structures of regional economies | 第119-120页 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 第120-131页 |
