| Acknowledgements | 第6-7页 |
| 摘要 | 第7-8页 |
| Abstract | 第8页 |
| INTRODUCTION | 第11-15页 |
| 0.1 Literature Review | 第12-14页 |
| 0.2 Research Motivation | 第14-15页 |
| CHAPTER1: SOFT POWER AND SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY | 第15-19页 |
| 1.1 The Overview of Soft Power and Soft Power Diplomacy | 第15-16页 |
| 1.2 The Relative Value of Hard Power and Soft Power | 第16-17页 |
| 1.3 The Impact of The Concept of Soft Power on The Practice of Diplomacy | 第17-19页 |
| CHAPTER2: CHINA SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY IN AFRICA | 第19-26页 |
| 2.1 The Overview Of Chinese Soft Power Diplomacy In Africa | 第19-20页 |
| 2.2 China’s Current African Policy | 第20-21页 |
| 2.3 Factors That Affects The Effectiveness Of China’s Soft Power Diplomacy And Western Powers’ Reaction | 第21-26页 |
| CHPATER 3 CASE STUDY: FRANCE’s REACTION TO CHINAS SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY INCAMEROON | 第26-43页 |
| 3.1 China’s Presence In Cameroon | 第26-32页 |
| 3.1.1 Chinese Aid To Cameroon | 第29-31页 |
| 3.1.2 Impact of China’s Aid to Cameroon | 第31-32页 |
| 3.2 History And Evolution Of Cameroon-France Relations | 第32-37页 |
| 3.2.1 The Hidden History Of France-Cameroon: The Bamileke Massacres | 第33-35页 |
| 3.2.2 The Disadvantages of This Cooperation | 第35-37页 |
| 3.3 France’s Reaction to China to Its Power Losing in Cameroon | 第37-43页 |
| 3.3.1 Destabilization of Cameroon through Terrorism | 第39-40页 |
| 3.3.2 Boko Haram Terrorists Attack On Chinese Firms In Cameroon | 第40页 |
| 3.3.3 The Use Of The Media In Response Of The Chinas Soft Power Diplomacy In Cameroon | 第40-41页 |
| 3.3.4 How Does China React In Response To France In Cameroon? | 第41-43页 |
| Chapter 4: Conclusion | 第43-45页 |
| References | 第45-48页 |
