| 中文摘要 | 第4-8页 |
| ABSTRACT | 第8-12页 |
| Abbreviations | 第13-16页 |
| CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND OF NEPAL-INDIA RELATIONS | 第16-22页 |
| 1.1 BACKGROUND OF INDIA-NEPAL RELATIONS | 第16-17页 |
| 1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION | 第17页 |
| 1.3 MAIN ARGUMENT | 第17-18页 |
| 1.4 METHODOLOGY | 第18页 |
| 1.5 DATA SOURCE: | 第18页 |
| 1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW | 第18-20页 |
| 1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK | 第20页 |
| 1.8 GAP IN THE LITERATURE | 第20-21页 |
| 1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS | 第21-22页 |
| CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK | 第22-28页 |
| 1.10 ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: AS TOOLS OR INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION | 第22-23页 |
| 1.11 HAVE THEY BEEN SUCCESSFUL? WHY? WHY NOT? | 第23-28页 |
| CHAPTER III: CRISIS ON INDO-NEPAL RELATIONSHIP | 第28-40页 |
| 1.12 ECONOMIC SANCTION 1989-1990 | 第28-32页 |
| 1.13 DISPUTES ON TRADE AND TRANSIT TREATY | 第32-34页 |
| 1.14 RAJEEV GANDHI'S VISIT TO NEPAL | 第34页 |
| 1.15 SOCIAL CLASH IN MEGHALAYA AGAINST NEPALESE ORIGIN'S INDIANS | 第34-35页 |
| 1.16 WORK-PERMIT FOR INDIAN WORKER | 第35-36页 |
| 1.17 CHANGING SECURITY DIMENSIONS; INDIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SRI LANKA | 第36-37页 |
| 1.18 NEPAL'S ARMS IMPORT FROM CHINA | 第37-40页 |
| CHAPTER IV: INDO-NEPAL RELATIONS AFTER THE ECONOMIC SANCTION | 第40-51页 |
| 1.19 POLITICAL SCENARIO OF INDO-NEPAL RELATION AFTER ECONOMIC SANCTION | 第40-43页 |
| 1.20 DOMESTIC POLITICS OF INDIA | 第43-48页 |
| 1.21 ECONOMIC SANCTION SUCCESS OR FAILURE? | 第48-51页 |
| CHAPTER V: SWOT ANALYSIS ON NEPAL-INDIA FOREIGN POLICY DURING 1989-90 | 第51-64页 |
| Introduction | 第51页 |
| 1.22 INTERNAL FACTORS | 第51-53页 |
| 1.23 WEAKNESSES | 第53-57页 |
| 1.24 EXTERNAL FACTORS | 第57-58页 |
| 1.25 THREATS | 第58-64页 |
| CHAPTER VI CONCLUSION | 第64-68页 |
| AACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | 第68-69页 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 第69-71页 |
