| ABSTRACT | 第5-7页 |
| 摘要 | 第8-15页 |
| List of Symbols | 第15-16页 |
| List of Abbreviations | 第16-19页 |
| Chapter 1 Background | 第19-31页 |
| 1.1 Complex Systems | 第19-20页 |
| 1.2 Game Theory and Evolutionary Game Theory | 第20-23页 |
| 1.2.1 Game Theory | 第20-23页 |
| 1.2.2 Evolutionary Game Theory | 第23页 |
| 1.3 Evolution of Cooperation in Complex Systems | 第23-28页 |
| 1.3.1 Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation | 第23-25页 |
| 1.3.2 Stochastic Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation | 第25-26页 |
| 1.3.3 Cooperation-promoting Mechanisms | 第26-28页 |
| 1.4 Organization and Contributions | 第28-31页 |
| Chapter 2 Emergence of Parochial Altruism in Well-mixed Populations of MultipleGroups | 第31-49页 |
| 2.1 Introduction | 第31-33页 |
| 2.2 Model | 第33-36页 |
| 2.3 Results and Discussions | 第36-46页 |
| 2.3.1 Effects of Intergroup Conflict and Assortment on the Emergence ofParochial Altruism | 第36-42页 |
| 2.3.2 Influences of Group Affiliation on the Emergence of Parochial Altruism | 第42-46页 |
| 2.4 Summary | 第46-49页 |
| Chapter 3 Emergence of Global Cooperation in Group-structured Populations withMigration | 第49-63页 |
| 3.1 Introduction | 第49-51页 |
| 3.2 Model | 第51-52页 |
| 3.3 Results and Discussions | 第52-61页 |
| 3.3.1 Effects of Migration Patterns on the Emergence of Global Cooperation | 第52-56页 |
| 3.3.2 Influences of Leader Punishment on the Emergence of Global Cooperation | 第56-61页 |
| 3.4 Summary | 第61-63页 |
| Chapter 4 Emergence of Cooperation in Group-interaction Populations with Stochastic Opting-out | 第63-73页 |
| 4.1 Introduction | 第63-64页 |
| 4.2 Model | 第64-65页 |
| 4.3 Results and Discussions | 第65-71页 |
| 4.4 Summary | 第71-73页 |
| Chapter 5 Emergence of Cooperation in Well-mixed Populations Driven by CostlyPunishment | 第73-85页 |
| 5.1 Introduction | 第73-75页 |
| 5.2 Model | 第75-76页 |
| 5.3 Results and Discussions | 第76-83页 |
| 5.3.1 Effects of Punishment Patterns on the Emergence of Cooperation | 第77-79页 |
| 5.3.2 Influences of Anti-social Punishment on the Emergence of Cooperation | 第79-83页 |
| 5.4 Summary | 第83-85页 |
| Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future Works | 第85-89页 |
| 6.1 Conclusions | 第85-86页 |
| 6.2 Future Works | 第86-89页 |
| Reference | 第89-107页 |
| Appendix A Conditions for Strategies to Emerge in Well-mixed Populations of Multiple Groups | 第107-111页 |
| Appendix B Conditions for Strategies to Emerge in Group-structured Populations withMigration | 第111-125页 |
| Appendix C Conditions for Cooperation to Emerge in Populations with StochasticOpting-out | 第125-145页 |
| Appendix D Calculation of Strategies’ Payoff in Well-mixed Populations Driven byPunishment | 第145-147页 |
| Acknowledgement | 第147-149页 |
| Biography | 第149-150页 |
