| Acknowledgement | 第5-6页 |
| Abstract | 第6-8页 |
| 摘要 | 第9-16页 |
| 1. Introduction | 第16-33页 |
| 1.1 Background of the study | 第16-19页 |
| 1.2 Motivation and objectives of the study | 第19-22页 |
| 1.3 Contribution and significance of the study | 第22-23页 |
| 1.4 An overview of Chinese capital market | 第23-31页 |
| 1.4.1 Development and structure of Chinese capital market | 第24-28页 |
| 1.4.2 Investors and market characteristics | 第28-31页 |
| 1.4.3 Agency conflict and information environment in China | 第31页 |
| 1.5 Why China as a study setting | 第31-32页 |
| 1.6 Manuscript structure | 第32-33页 |
| 2. Theoretic backdrop and the core concepts | 第33-45页 |
| 2.1 Information quality/risk | 第33-36页 |
| 2.2 Liquidity | 第36-38页 |
| 2.2.1 Stock Liquidity | 第36-37页 |
| 2.2.2 Liquidity risk | 第37-38页 |
| 2.3 Agency conflict | 第38-40页 |
| 2.3.1 Principal-Agent agency conflict | 第39页 |
| 2.3.2 Principal-Principal agency conflict | 第39-40页 |
| 2.4 Theories of disclosure | 第40-45页 |
| 2.4.1 Positive accounting theory | 第41-42页 |
| 2.4.2 Opportunistic versus efficiency perspective of disclosure | 第42页 |
| 2.4.3 Theory of full disclosure | 第42-43页 |
| 2.4.4 General theory of voluntary disclosure | 第43-44页 |
| 2.4.5 The information and agency framework of disclosure | 第44-45页 |
| 3. Literature review and hypotheses development | 第45-56页 |
| 3.1 Information quality/risk and the cost of capital | 第45-49页 |
| 3.2 Information quality, stock liquidity/liquidity risk, and required returns | 第49-51页 |
| 3.3 Principal-principal agency conflict, information quality,and the cost of capital | 第51-54页 |
| 3.4 Integrated conceptual framework | 第54-56页 |
| 4. Research design | 第56-80页 |
| 4.1 Sample and data | 第56-57页 |
| 4.2 Defining/measuring some major variables | 第57-66页 |
| 4.2.1 Measuring information quality | 第57-60页 |
| 4.2.2 Measuring the cost of capital | 第60页 |
| 4.2.3 Measuring the stock liquidity | 第60-62页 |
| 4.2.4 Measuring the liquidity risk factor | 第62-64页 |
| 4.2.5 Measuring principal-principal agency conflict | 第64-66页 |
| 4.3 Modeling information quality/risk and the cost of capital | 第66-70页 |
| 4.3.1 Testing hypothesis 1 | 第66-67页 |
| 4.3.2 Testing hypothesis 2 | 第67-68页 |
| 4.3.3 Testing hypothesis 3 | 第68-70页 |
| 4.4 Modeling information quality, liquidity, and required returns | 第70-76页 |
| 4.4.1 Testing hypotheses 4&5 | 第70-72页 |
| 4.4.2 Testing hypotheses 6&7 | 第72-76页 |
| 4.5 Modeling P-P agency conflict, information quality, and cost of capital | 第76-79页 |
| 4.5.1 Testing hypothesis 8 | 第76-77页 |
| 4.5.2 Testing hypothesis 9&10 | 第77-79页 |
| 4.6 Controlling for state ownership | 第79-80页 |
| 5. Results and analyses | 第80-119页 |
| 5.1 H1:Information quality and the cost of capital | 第80-86页 |
| 5.1.1 Summary Statistics | 第80-82页 |
| 5.1.2 Accruals quality and cost of capital | 第82-86页 |
| 5.2 H2: information quality and future stock returns | 第86-87页 |
| 5.3 H3: Market pricing of information risk | 第87-93页 |
| 5.4 H4&H5:information quality, stock liquidity, and returns | 第93-98页 |
| 5.4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis | 第93-95页 |
| 5.4.2 Information quality, stock liquidity, and excess returns | 第95-98页 |
| 5.5 H6&H7: information quality, liquidity risk, and return | 第98-106页 |
| 5.5.1 Descriptive statistics: liquidity risk analysis | 第98-99页 |
| 5.5.2 Market pricing of liquidity risk | 第99-101页 |
| 5.5.3 Information quality and liquidity risk | 第101-106页 |
| 5.6 H8: P-P agency conflict and information quality | 第106-110页 |
| 5.7 H9&H10: ownership concentration, information quality, and returns | 第110-119页 |
| 5.7.1 Descriptive Statistics and correlation analysis | 第110-112页 |
| 5.7.2 Ownership concentration and the cost of equity | 第112-116页 |
| 5.7.3 The moderating role of disclosure quality | 第116-119页 |
| 6. Summary | 第119-123页 |
| 6.1 Information quality/risk and the cost of capital | 第119-120页 |
| 6.2 Information quality, stock liquidity/liquidity risk, and required returns | 第120-121页 |
| 6.3 PP agency conflict, information quality, and the cost of equity | 第121-123页 |
| References | 第123-129页 |
