| 摘要 | 第5-7页 |
| abstract | 第7-9页 |
| CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION | 第12-28页 |
| 1.1 Background of the study | 第13-15页 |
| 1.1.1 Significance of the study | 第15页 |
| 1.2 Proposal of the thesis | 第15-16页 |
| 1.2.1 Structure of the thesis | 第15-16页 |
| 1.2.2 Research questions | 第16页 |
| 1.2.3 Hypothesis | 第16页 |
| 1.2.4 Methodology | 第16页 |
| 1.3 Objectives of the study | 第16-17页 |
| 1.4 Analytical framework | 第17-18页 |
| 1.5 Literature Review | 第18-28页 |
| 1.5.1 Definition of Key Concepts | 第18-26页 |
| 1.5.2 Challenges and Prospects of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan | 第26-28页 |
| CHAPTER2: The characteristic of the U.S. counter-insurgency Strategy towards Afghanistan | 第28-36页 |
| 2.1. Taking “protect population” as core task | 第28-31页 |
| 2.2. Adopting “talk and defeat” tactics | 第31-34页 |
| 2.3. Establishing legitimate government as main endeavor | 第34-36页 |
| CHAPTER3: The restriction of internal factors on the U.S. counter-insurgency endeavor | 第36-49页 |
| 3.1. Pashtunism and Ethnicity conflict | 第36-40页 |
| 3.2. Radical Islam interpretation and informal educational system | 第40-44页 |
| 3.3. Slow progress in nation-rebuilding | 第44-49页 |
| CHAPTER4: The negative counteracts of regional geo-politics to the U.S. counter-insurgencyendeavor | 第49-70页 |
| 4.1. Pakistan’s double role and insurgents resurge | 第49-57页 |
| 4.1.1. Durand controversy | 第54-56页 |
| 4.1.2. Influence of India-Pakistan Conflict on Afghanistan | 第56-57页 |
| 4.2. Iran’s support and insurgents influence extend | 第57-61页 |
| 4.3. Russia and instability in Afghanistan | 第61-70页 |
| CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion and recommendations | 第70-73页 |
| 5.1. Conclusion | 第70-71页 |
| 5.2. Recommendation | 第71-73页 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 第73-77页 |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENT | 第77页 |
